Scientific modelling often strays deliberately from the truth---appealing to such devices as idealization and metaphor. " Idealization, Explanation and Fiction" explores the scientific practice of explanation via non-veridical representation. I offer a general treatment of model-based explanation, and several case studies from biology.;My perspective emphasizes the underlying goal of understanding. I argue for a conception of explanation on which two sorts of factors affect explanatory "goodness"---causal content and representational organization. This two-dimensional conception accounts for the function of idealization, and can be extended to metaphors.;The concomitant exploration of case studies is geared towards showing how non-veridical representations contribute to scientific understanding, while also pointing to their potential to mislead. In putting forward the two-dimensional view I look at a model of the dynamics of HIV/AIDS. In it, a sacrifice of causal content permits the model to make important factors salient, and to unify a range of phenomena. I argue that this is a feature of idealization more generally. A second case study targets the concept of information in biology. I propose that informational notions are metaphors, albeit explanatory ones, allowing biologists to better represent mechanisms of regulation and control. Thirdly, I discuss game theoretic explanations of the evolution of morality. Here idealizing assumptions have unjustifiably dominated the development of the models. I argue that in modelling the evolution of morality conceptual progress has been confused for empirically grounded understanding. |