| The link between oil and international security is more complex than commonly believed. Petrostates---the oil producing and exporting countries---are more often the aggressors in international disputes than they are the targets of conquest or international resource competition. This dissertation develops and tests a theory of resource-backed aggression based on the interaction between oil and domestic revolution. Revolutionary governments are posited to increase states' propensity for launching international conflicts. Oil is theorized to have two effects, one conflict-enhancing (by reducing the leader's risk of domestic punishment for foreign policy adventurism and increasing the state's military capacity) and one conflict-reducing (by increasing the economic incentives for peaceful international trade and stability in the global oil export market). The theory is tested using both quantitative and qualitative methods. Quantitatively, the hypotheses are tested using panel data on militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) over the period 1945-2001. Qualitatively, country-case studies of Libya, Venezuela, and Saudi Arabia are used to probe the validity of the theory, and are compared to three revolutionary non-petrostates: Egypt, Cuba, and Bolivia. The research design therefore tests the impact of both oil and revolutionary governments. The findings suggest that revolutionary petrostates have a high propensity for international conflict, even in comparison to revolutionary governments in comparable non-petrostates. |
