Giving reasons: Why and how public institutions justify their decisions

Since antiquity, philosophers have seen the public use of reason as the essential feature of a democratic polity. In today's large democratic societies, lawyers and courts claim an increasing share of the use of public reason. Though a vital democracy depends upon a hierarchy of institutions, philosophers have not adequately addressed the extent to which different institutional and social contexts inform the common practices of giving and asking for reasons.;It is one of the enduring paradoxes of legal practice that some institutions must give reasons to substantiate their decisions while other institutions remain free from the obligation of reason giving. Some institutions, for instance courts, are generally duty-bound to provide reasons for their decisions. Other institutions, such as legislatures, have the discretion to give reasons or not. A third class of democratic institutions, the jury for example, enjoys the privilege of never bearing the obligation to give reasons. What philosophical premises purport to justify these discrepancies?;On the basis of research in law and philosophy, my work offers a new theory of legal reason giving in democratic society. Current orthodoxy in political theory takes it for granted that reasons are a good thing and that giving reasons should be the norm in the realm of public action. In fact, however, the value of giving reasons is a highly contingent practice dependent on context. If insufficient reasons may be harmful, too many reasons or inadequate reasons can also hinder the public use of reason.