The dissent papers: The voice of diplomats in the Cold War and beyond

This dissertation examines the official writings and personal experiences of U.S. diplomats since the end of World War Two who have disagreed with fundamental aspects of the nation's foreign policies, including the militarization of the Cold War, the refusal to cooperate with the Chinese Communists, involvement in Vietnam, and more recently the war in Iraq. Analyzing the memos and telegrams of these diplomats in their historical and institutional context, and in the tradition and practice of diplomatic writing, I aim to shed light on the phenomenon of internal dissent, particularly as it relates to the formal process of knowledge production and exchange in the foreign affairs bureaucracy. In voicing their positions, I argue, some of the most notable dissenters in the State Department focused on the form as well as the content of their argument, believing the two to be inextricably linked. By harnessing and transforming the formal conventions of the bureaucratic policy debate, they were able to transcend their status within the foreign affairs bureaucracy and gain a high-level audience for their views. The strategies and tactics these dissenters used to change policy through the written word contributed, paradoxically, to both the momentary triumphs and ultimate limits of insider dissent. Conversely, the same attempts often fueled antagonisms between dissenters on the inside and the American public on the outside, before emerging as a potential bridge between the two.