| For more than two generations, studies linking domestic political unrest with foreign policy behavior have been beset by inconsistent findings and consistent revision. In this project, I ask the following questions: Is there a politics of opposites, where hawks are better at selling cooperation to their publics, and doves are better at selling conflict? If so, do domestic opposition parties and/or rival states respond to the domestic political environment that confronts a leader at home?;To address these questions I develop a theory in which foreign policy is the product of strategic interactions between competing states and political parties. To do this, I draw on a nascent but related body of work that suggests leaders have either hawkish or dovish preferences which shape their interactions with competitors at home and abroad. First, I argue that a hardline foreign policy helps doves obtain the electoral benefit of a politics of opposites because it proves their moderate credentials in foreign policy. As a result, I expect doves will be more likely than hawks to pursue a hardline in foreign policy as their electoral support diminishes. I then consider the counter-intuitive proposition that domestic opposition parties and rival states avoid more dovish leaders who are experiencing domestic political unrest. Specifically, I argue rival states are more likely to avoid doves and exploit hawks in periods where their counterpart is experiencing electoral distress. At the same time, domestic opposition parties are more likely to throw their support behind more dovish leaders and oppose more hawkish ones. Empirical analyses support these propositions in the context of U.S. foreign policy for the final 25 years of the Cold War from 1966 to 1991. This proposition is further supported in a detailed analysis of U.S.-China rapprochement under Richard M. Nixon. |
