| Since its inception as an academic discipline approximately fifty years ago, environmental ethics has challenged assumptions about morality and traditional ways of doing ethics. In response to specific environmental problems, such as the widespread use of synthetic organic pesticides, deforestation, and species loss, it has raised many questions about intrinsic value, moral standing, and relative goods. Yet (as has been widely noted) it has not produced substantial agreement on the causes or solutions to these problems.;These problems do not have simple solutions, but they cannot be tabled until theoretical agreement is reached. I argue that a case-based approach to environmental decision-making is a better practical alternative than others that have been proposed, one that is well-suited to the uncertain context of environmental ethics. Case-based reasoning, or casuistry, developed in a socio-historical setting not unlike our own. Through its distinctive method, casuistry can yield consensus on a course of action without needing agreement "all the way down." As each case is resolved, it contributes to a body of moral knowledge that can be used in addressing future dilemmas.;Case-based reasoning has been successfully applied in other fields of ethical inquiry, notably biomedical ethics and just war theory. This project seeks to give a full account of an environmental casuistry, incorporating each of the constituent features of casuistry: analogies to paradigm cases, appeal to principles or maxims, and the opinions of authorities. It further suggests that the principles of justice, prudence, diversity, and preservation have particular relevance to environmental ethics.;This case-based method is then applied to the question of whether to increase civilian nuclear power generation, which can be considered a paradigmatic example of an environmental ethical dilemma. This example also highlights other characteristic features of casuistry: using the principle of double intent to evaluate moral culpability for the consequences of an act, and distinguishing between permissible, prohibited, and obligatory actions, as well as between probable decisions and doubtful ones. The conclusion considers potential limitations of an environmental casuistry and directions for future research, including the relationship between casuistry and moral intuition. |
