| China has so far managed to sustain its fast-paced economic growth, and the government has proven itself remarkably resilient while its counterparts in many other transitional countries have fallen apart. This dissertation studies the most important political institution in the Chinese political system---the nomenklatura system. In this dissertation, I empirically examine Chinese local officials' political mobility during the period of 1983--2002. The findings contradict the conventional wisdom that there has been no political change accompanying significant economic decentralization in China. It contends that since the reform in 1983, there has been a wholesale turnaround in the evaluation criteria for provincial officials. Political conformity that used to be the only important pre-reform criterion for promotion, has given way to economic performance and other competence-related indicators. On the other hand, the CCCP has been able to reward political loyalty by deploying dual criteria regarding a provincial official's promotion and demotion. The political reforms in the personnel management demonstrate the CCP's shrewdly pragmatic approach towards reform and innovation in a decentralized and highly uncertain environment. The CCP's strategic optimization of monitoring in critical policies areas, along with these gradual institutional innovations, has enabled itself to maintain a tight grip on the cadre promotion system. |
