| This dissertation thus seeks to answer two related questions: First, why did labor laws behave differently from other economic policy areas in Latin America during the reform period? And second, what accounts for the variation in the design of labor regulations across countries in the region?;To answer these questions, I develop a theory based on two demand-side factors---the skill distribution in the economy and the organizational capacity of labor---and two supply-side factors---the nature of the political regime and the coalitional dynamics of electoral politics. I argue that where workers have mid- to high-level skills and sufficient leadership or ties to political parties, they can be most effective in forming coalitions that preserve or increase the protectiveness of labor legislation. Where unskilled labor predominates, and where ties to political parties are weak, or when electoral dynamics are interrupted by authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes, labor regulation tends to be less developed or protective of labor.;The theory is tested in two ways. First, I conduct econometric analysis using an original dataset of 23 labor law provisions in 18 Latin American countries in the pre-reform, reform, and post-reform periods. This provides initial support for my theory, as both organizational capacity (proxied by unionization rates) and skill levels (proxied by years of schooling of the working-age population) are positively and significantly correlated with variation in labor law regulation; none of the other variables which receive attention in the literature on social policy have statistically significant relationships to the labor code. Second, I construct analytic narratives for two countries in Latin America---one of which was strongly protective and highly resistant to change (Argentina) and one that provided focused protections for a small subset of its workers and later underwent significant transformation in the reform period (Peru). This allows me to detect the finer-grained historical and political processes by which the skill levels and union organization have shaped labor law development.;In the case of Argentina, I find that higher skill levels, due to immigration from Europe in late 19th and early 20th century and a decisive policy of industrial promotion in the 1940s and 1950s, and the high level of union organization, made workers a crucial constituency for the military government that took power in 1943 to bring into its coalition. Protective labor laws, promoted by Juan Domingo Peron, first as Secretary of Labor and then as President, were a cornerstone in this effort to unite workers into the personally responsive Peronist movement. However, I also argue that long-term patterns of electoral politics have produced a non-monotonic relationship between the fate of organized labor, both organized and informal, and the Peronist Partido Justicialista. Greatest legal gains for labor have come during Peronist resurgences and, counter-intuitively, during periods of internal division within the PJ while it was in power. Retrenchment on labor policy, on the other hand, has come during periods of Radical or military rule, when the Peronists were weakest, and early in the presidency of Carlos Menem, when the Peronist hold on power was strong enough that the demands of organized labor could be marginalized in favor of export-oriented reforms. The economic and political crisis of 2001--2002 and divisions within the party in the 2003 election of Nestor Kirchner brought him to power with a small minority of the vote; his and his wife's (current President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner) more labor-friendly policies constitute an effort to rebuild a labor base for their party.;In the case of Peru, I argue that the lower level of skills and a smaller, divided unionized sector made organization around issues of individual contracting and collective representation protections more difficult. As a result, the nation developed labor laws that were protective of only a small segment of the population---the formal, unionized sectors---and that labor law expansion saw its greatest advances under the "Revolutionary" military regime of 1968--1975. In the reform process, unions were able to preserve their representational rights, but sacrificed individual rights for non-unionized workers. In addition, political organization was complicated by the more problematic electoral fortunes and performance while in office of the APRA party. With less periods in power, a smaller representation in Congress, and an often conflictual relationship with labor, APRA offered less opportunities for the advancement of labor's interests. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)... |
