| This dissertation focuses on the role of political parties in the formation of tax policy in contemporary Latin America. Taxation is conceptualized as an instrument of public policy that policymakers have at their disposal to pursue their respective policy objectives and cater to their political bases, be they broad or narrow in scope. The essential questions are: to whom are policymakers catering? To what extent are tax instruments used to promote particularistic interests? I draw on an extensive scholarship on political parties, clientelism and political accountability to provide a unique framework for studying the politics of taxation. This framework makes a distinction between the formation of policy in inchoate, non-programmatic and institutionalized, programmatic party systems. In the latter, one observes at least the contours of parties competing for votes by articulating distinct policy positions, thereby catering to broader political bases; by contrast, in the former, parties compete for votes by other means. As a result, in inchoate, non-programmatic party systems, parties do not pursue clearly articulated policy goals and interests go under-represented. Clientelism is prevalent across Latin America, but one observes variation in the passing rates of tax policy initiatives which aim to secure policy benefits for select firms, sectors and geographic regions. Hence, rent-seeking pressures appear to be curbed by a more competitive political process in institutionalized, programmatic party systems. This dissertation contributes to extensive bodies of scholarship on political parties, clientelism, political accountability and political competition. |
