Beyond sovereignty and anarchy: Ontological foundations of political order

In this dissertation I argue that in order to amend state sovereignty from its historically inherited form, we must first free ourselves from the captivity of subjectivist assumptions that make sovereignty seem necessary in order to maintain political order. I argue that the modern ontology of the subject produced four philosophical problems---epistemic uncertainty, moral relativism, linguistic indeterminacy, and an ethos of possessive mastery---each of which could lead to social and political upheaval. Through a reading of Hobbes and Spinoza, I demonstrate that early modern political theorists believed that the institution of sovereignty was necessary in order to resolve the problems that arise from this subjectivist ontology. After establishing the origins of sovereigntist thinking in early modern subjectivist metaphysics, I return to the present and survey the ways in which subjectivist assumptions continue to inform contemporary discussions of sovereignty. On the basis of a survey of the influence of subjectivist assumptions in contemporary international relations scholarship, I conclude that prior to amending state sovereignty from its historically inherited forms it is first necessary to reformulate political theory on non-subjectivist assumptions. Through a reading of critiques of sovereignty offered by Arendt and Foucault, I identify four concepts that can be usefully deployed to rethink global politics along non-subjectivist lines: Arendt's concept of political freedom, Foucault's theory of power as acting upon the actions of others, Arendt's concept of the council system as a model of politics not based on the principle of rule, and Foucault's re-description of human rights as governmental rather than juridical. I conclude by analyzing how the subjectivist assumptions discussed in the first part of the dissertation are at work in contemporary debates over humanitarian intervention. Drawing on Arendt's and Foucault's non-subjectivist approach to politics, I suggest an alternative approach to humanitarian intervention that does not recreate the problems associated with sovereignty and subjectivism that I have identified in this dissertation.