| The weapons acquisition process in the United States is a complex system guided by numerous rules and regulations. Government program offices are responsible for abiding by statutes and regulations as they oversee the building of weapons from start to finish. This research set out to understand why there is a difference in perception between a recent RAND study finding that the burden associated with compliance of these rules and regulations is minimal and the belief of program office personnel that it is not.;This study concludes that the burden on program office personnel is not a result of the time spent complying with rules and regulations (what the RAND study set out to measure), but rather a burden created by the complex and incoherent system that these rules and regulations create. The system was analyzed within the broader context of the following questions: One, what is the purpose of the weapons acquisition system?; Two, Is it well designed to achieve this purpose?; Three, are the controls built into the system adequate and necessary?; Four, is there an audit function that provides information as to whether or not the business process is achieving the intended purpose and ensuring that controls are in place and being used correctly?;The results indicate that the current "system" is an accumulation of rules, not a well-designed system. For example, this research reveals that program offices are guided by too many rules, many of which conflict with one another. This research reveals that the weapons acquisition process is lacking a clearly defined purpose, adequate controls and a necessary audit function. |
