The Acquisition of Chemical Weapons in Iraq: The Social Construction of a Weapon of Mass Destruction in a Rough Neighborhood

The threat of chemical weapons use in the Middle East has been a serious global concern at least since the 1960s. In spite of the 1996 ban on chemical weapons through the Chemical Weapons Convention, chemical weapons continue to exist in some states, and other states have indicated some interest in obtaining these weapons. This dissertation focuses on the contemporary framework for chemical weapon accumulation, the motivations that drive acquisition, and factors that contribute to or limit this drive. Drawing from historical, comparative political, sociological and international relations theory, this study focuses on the acquisition of chemical weapons as phenomena distinct from the employment of such weapons---placing emphasis on the "indigenous" decision to embark on a chemical weapons program. The central premise of this study is that, as the product of a fundamentally political process, the acquisition decision does not occur in response to a technological imperative, or military threat, but is driven instead by a combination of motives including the cultural and ideological derived synthesis of national identity, national roles and strategies, military doctrines, and the availability of concomitant weapons systems.;Iraq is used as a case study in deriving a framework for a robust acquisition model that offers insights into the continuing problem of chemical weapons acquisition in the Middle East. The central hypothesis is that Iraq developed a radical militarist political identity that fuelled the effort to establish a chemical weapons program. Within the model developed, regime-based cultural, organizational and leadership orientations resulted in a radical militarism that made the acquisition of chemical weapons in Iraq a virtual necessity.