From method to practice: A critique of two models for relating science and religion

Several scholars in recent decades have sought to demonstrate a close link between the methods of scientific inquiry and the methods of theological reflection, intending to justify the rationality of religious belief. This dissertation evaluates that intellectual project in light of recent work in philosophy and history of science. Two prominent and representative examples of such efforts---the accounts of rationality set forth by Nancey Murphy and J. Wentzel van Huyssteen---are analyzed in detail. The dissertation argues that these contributions rely upon problematic assumptions, the most questionable being that there can be a single model of scientific rationality suitable for adjudicating the rationality of theological work.;The first part of the dissertation reviews recent developments in the field of science studies, showing how they undermine still-prevalent Enlightenment assumptions about science. The primary conclusion from this review is that there can be no single account of scientific method because of the diversity of scientific activities.;The second part criticizes the models of rationality presented by Murphy and van Huyssteen using the material from part one. Murphy's theological appropriation of Imre Lakatos' philosophy of science does not accomplish her goals primarily because of flaws in Lakatos' methodology: it is too rigid to account for the history of actual scientific practice. Van Huyssteen presumes less than Murphy about the universal rationality of scientific practice yet he still overreaches by claiming to have met the challenge to the intellectual integrity of theological reflection by identifying common resources of rationality between theology and science.;The final chapter of the dissertation argues against the "credibility strategy" that underlies much of the methodological work on science and religion, including that of Murphy and van Huyssteen. This refers to attempts to demonstrate that theology either is or can be rational in the same way that science is. This strategy is shown to have a long history in the Christian tradition, where theologians have repeatedly turned to science as an exemplar of proper intellectual activity. The dissertation concludes by arguing against the large-scale theories of science upon which the credibility strategy depends.