The ability of intelligence to prevent domestic bioterrorism

After the anthrax letter attacks of 2001 and subsequent revelations of al-Qa'ida's intent to acquire and use biological weapons there has been much activity in biodefense, almost exclusively in the areas of preparedness and response. However, it has been said that the best defense is a good offense. A system that relies on early warning and improved response will not prevent a bioterrorist attack; in order to stop an event before it occurs, an effort must be made to pursue potential bioterrorists and identify, disrupt, and prevent future bioterrorist attacks.;Intelligence is the primary means by which the U.S. Government identifies terrorist plans and activities, therefore a review of intelligence capabilities directed against the domestic bioterrorist threat is valuable in determining gaps in bioterrorism prevention. Although there has been significant review of foreign intelligence activities against weapons of mass destruction, there has been no public review of how best to position and build intelligence resources specifically for the domestic bioterrorist threat. This dissertation first analyzes the likelihood of domestic bioterrorism and builds the case for an evolving bio-threat from actors based in the United States. Next, U.S. intelligence and law enforcement policies, programs, and collection capabilities are reviewed to determine the level of effort and effectiveness in preventing domestic bioterrorist threats. This study finds that U.S. anti-bioterrorism policies and programs neglect domestic preventive measures yet international efforts focus heavily on such issues. Case studies of past biological weapons targets reveal that traditional intelligence and law enforcement methods are ill-suited to identify and prevent acts of domestic bioterrorism. This study recommends a shift from a national strategy of "biodefense" to a more comprehensive "counter-bioterrorism" approach to include a domestic bio-intelligence capability. Specific recommendations include new concepts for domestic collection of biological intelligence, creation of a biosecurity inspection organization, and overt human intelligence collection from non-traditional sources.