SOX generated changes in board composition: Have they mattered

This dissertation provides a unique contribution to two significant and topical streams of research. First it contributes to the vast amount of work done on the influence(s), if any, of a board of directors' composition, in particular the presence of "independent" directors. Additionally it contributes to current research into the effects, if any, of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX herein after) and associated stock exchange regulations on publicly listed firms. The primary methodological tool used is the difference-in-differences natural experiment methodology.;This analysis advances the study of effects associated with the use of independent directors, as it employs the difference-in-differences methodology to overcome the endogeneity concerns which have plagued this stream of literature. I accomplish this through timely examination of the effects associated with the exogenously forced addition of independent directors to the boards of publicly listed firms in the wake of SOX and associated stock exchange listing requirement changes. This dissertation's primary aim was to investigate possible effects in five potential areas of board influence: CEO Compensation; Dividend Policy; Discouraging Earnings Management: Spending for Auditor Services; and Approval of capital allocations to optimize risk-adjusted returns.;The study further advances our understanding of the effects of SOX and associated stock exchange listing requirement changes as it uses the difference-in-differences methodology by segregating firms which had pre-adopted regulations in SOX away from firms that only adopted the regulations once compelled by law. Through this method, this dissertation provides empirical evidence of effects attributable to SOX and related stock exchange regulations not muted by a failure to segregate out these early adopters. I find that firms that were compelled to increase their use of independent directors: (1) increased their CEO's total compensation by increasing the equity plus other components of their compensation packages; (2) increased their dividend ratios and dividend yields; (3) showed no clear evidence of affecting earnings management; (4) increased their spending for audit services; and (5) decreased their risk-adjusted returns performance.