The moral philosophy of the 'Mozi' 'Core Chapters'

The Mohists were a group of thinkers and reformers active during the Warring States Period of ancient China (481--221 B.C.), so named on account of Mozi (ca. 480--390 B.C.), the leader and founder of their community. This study describes and discusses salient aspects of their moral philosophy as it is exemplified in the Mozi "Core Chapters", a series of essays containing their arguments for ten key theses and associated practical political proposals that form the core of their doctrinal position.;The study begins by identifying the Mohists' moral philosophy with the articulation and rational defense of the theoretical foundations underlying their practical project to restore order to a world perceived to be in chaos. The most important part of this foundation is a conception of the ethical ideal, or more narrowly, a conception of yi--norms of conduct that individuals and communities ought to live by (and thus are enforced by the weight of social sanctions and the public powers) so that they can peacefully coexist in mutual benefit. This conception forms the substantive content of Mohist doctrine.;The bulk of the study articulates an interpretation of Mohist doctrine with the aim of exposing its logical structure. It does so by first investigating the criteria used by the Mohists to evaluate various practices as to whether or not it is yi. The study argues that among three main candidates: accordance with Heaven's will, conformity to the words and deeds of the ancient sage kings, and benefit to the world, the last is the Mohists' ultimate criterion for yi, one on the basis of which their proposals and claims are meant to be justified to doctrinal outsiders in a context of advocacy and disputation.;Implied in the Mohists' ultimate criterion for yi is a conception of the common benefit of the world or that which is impartially and equally the benefit of everyone. What this criterion entails is that practices are yi to the extent to which they are productive of the common benefit of the world. This broadly consequentialistic conception is best exemplified by the Mohists' call for people to practice jian'ai ---for them to be concerned about the welfare of others without distinction between self, associates and strangers---on the understanding that doing so will bring great benefit to the world and eliminate the most serious harms that beset it. The teaching of jian'ai thus identifies the substance of the Mohists' conception of yi, and forms the principal aspect of their doctrine.;But more than one version of jian'ai can be discerned from the Mohists' arguments. While these are all specifications of a basic notion of impartiality, they have different implications for conduct with varying degrees of stringency. Though a less stringent version of jian'ai is arguably implicit in widely shared moral opinions, the more stringent version is in conflict with such opinions. In addition, the conflict between the more stringent version of jian'ai and widely shared moral opinions has its roots in facts about the way human beings really are that are either very difficult or simply impossible to change. This conflict poses an intractable difficulty for an important part of the Mohists' doctrine, given their own ambition to justify their position to doctrinal outsiders.