On the normativity of the instrumental principle of reason

Certain practical norms, such as morality, prudence, or instrumental reason purport to have a kind of categorical authority over us. We are bound to follow their prescriptions whether we want to or not. We can question the justification of these norms and the source of their normativity or authority. How could such norms bind us? My dissertation is an investigation into the source of normativity for the norm of the instrumental principle of reason.;Philosophers have attempted to give accounts of the normativity of instrumental reason in a number of ways, by appealing to: theoretical norms on belief, particular constitutive arguments, the logical relations between the contents of mental states, or to pragmatic considerations concerning our agency. I show, however, that none of the existing accounts is satisfactory. I then suggest that a correct account of instrumental reason's normativity appeal to reasons of self-fidelity. That is, reasons to be faithful to oneself. However, this approach has some limitations as well. Finally, I develop desiderata that any successful theory of the normativity of the instrumental principle must meet in order to provide a satisfactory account.