The immanent word: The turn to language in German philosophy, 1759--1801

This dissertation establishes that the philosophical study of language inaugurated in the 1759 works of Hamann and Lessing entails a paradigm shift in modern philosophy; it analyzes the continuation and transformation of that shift in works of Herder, Kant, Fichte, Novalis and Schlegel. The Introduction asserts that studies of early linguistic philosophy have obscured the more relevant theoretical contributions of the thinkers at hand. I thus argue against the theological appropriation of Hamann by John Milbank; I maintain against Christina Lafont that Hamann and Herder cannot be tasked to represent early expressive theories of meaning; and, I emphasize against Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy that the literary accentuation of romantic exigency encumbers a critical analysis of Schlegel's ideological position, and consequently overlooks important methodological suggestions in Novalis. In Part I, close readings of the works of Hamann and Lessing uncover their emergent linguistic contentions. Their concerns about what they both take to be an insufficiently critical enlightenment philosophy are contextualized, and their epistemological, hermeneutic, and aesthetic suggestions are garnered and evaluated. In Part II, Herder's naturalistic reassessment of the prospects for linguistic study is considered also for its transcendental insight, and the exchanges between Hamann and Herder are reevaluated in the light of Kant's criticisms of linguistic philosophy. Kant's repudiation and appropriation of elements of Herder's linguistic philosophy are investigated in detail. I argue that questions about the immanence of transcendental idealism must be appraised with reference to Karat's denial of the more radical immanence of Herder's linguistic position. In Part III, Fichte's rejection of the Herderian program of linguistic inquiry is examined. I then argue that Novalis, in his critique of Fichte's philosophy, develops a unique but undeveloped linguistic theory using insights from Lessing, Herder and Kant. I dislodge Novalis's position from that of Schlegel, arguing that Schlegel returns to a Fichtean and universalizing idealism, and conclude that the emergent philosophy of language is undermined and confused in Schlegel's work. Throughout the dissertation, I assess the viability of certain suggestions of early linguistic thought with regard to problems in critical idealism as well as current difficulties in linguistic philosophy.