| In this dissertation, I argue for adopting a pluralistic ethical theory based upon the inadequacies of traditional ethical theories. The ethical pluralism which I argue for is a pluralism of ethical principles which cannot be prioritized in a determinate manner. I argue that the ultimate set of moral principles cannot be rank-ordered in such a manner that yields determinate answers based merely upon the structure of the principles. The dissertation begins by arguing that the failure of monistic theories to account for the possibility of moral dilemmas provides good reason to begin to investigate a pluralistic ethical theory of principles. The dissertation then moves on to provide analyses of deontological and consequentialist ethical theories. I argue in Chapters 2 and 3 that both deontological and consequentialist ethical theories accurately capture some parts of morality, but both types of ethical theories are ultimately inadequate. The ethical pluralism which I endorse holds on to, and builds upon, some aspects of each of these theories, while jettisoning the problematic aspects. The dissertation then moves to a rejection of ethical relativism. Pluralism and relativism are sometimes thought to be related, and I want to emphasize the rejection of ethical relativism. In Chapter 5 I investigate both virtue ethics and some particular forms of ethical pluralism, e.g. John Kekes, Thomas Nagel, and Jurgen Habermas, and argue that each of these captures something which is correct, but that each should ultimately be rejected. The final chapter is the beginning of development reasonable non-prioritist pluralism. This is a form of ethical pluralism which relies upon reasonableness, overlapping consensus, reflective equilibrium, and coherence to develop a set of ethical principles which work together to capture the complexity of the moral realm. |
