The limits of accommodation: How Khrushchev, Ulbricht, and the Western allies failed to neutralize West Berlin, 1958--1960 (Nikita Khrushchev, Walter Ulbricht, Germany, Soviet Union)

Urged by the East Germans and emboldened by signs of American irresolution, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev started threatening allied military access to West Berlin in November 1958. The communists aimed to capture the city in order to consolidate the postwar status quo and soften the Western alliance in preparation of further advances. Unlike 1948--49, they refrained from threatening the West Berliners directly, targeting instead what they termed the "obsolete" US, British, and French occupation rights. They calculated that a forced withdrawal of the allied garrisons would doom West Berlin, seal the division of Germany, and irreparably damage the prestige of NATO, particularly the United States. This would usher in the Soviet domination of Western Europe and bring communism's world-wide victory one giant step closer.; The allied response was weak. Rather than nip creeping aggression in the bud, democracies generally prefer to stall until the danger becomes acute. In declining order from US President Dwight Eisenhower to French President Charles de Gaulle, the allies also secretly wished to rid themselves of the liability West Berlin. They sought a face-saving way to shorten their front lines and eliminate this irritant between East and West. At least the Americans and the British were rather naive about the prospects of a genuine detente with the USSR and ready to pay a considerable price for it. Against growing resistance from Bonn, the allies offered to weaken West Berlin's freedom, phase out their own presence, and recognize the postwar status quo in Germany and Europe.; But Khrushchev neither had the patience to allow a slow Western retreat nor the courage to quicken the pace by blocking allied access. Deadlock resulted in 1960. The allied appeasement continued under President John Kennedy, save on the central question of Berlin. Khrushchev eventually sought to resolve the impasse by menacing the United States directly with missiles emplaced in Cuba. Only this gamble's defeat impressed him with the risks of his confrontational course and ended the Berlin crisis soon thereafter.