| This dissertation explores the problem of constitution-making under conditions of deep disagreement over the underlying norms and ultimate goals of the state. Constitution-making is perceived as a high-stakes moment in which the polity's commitments and definitions are entrenched for future generations. In deeply divided societies, where intense polarization over competing visions of the state exist, drafting a formal constitution may exacerbate political tensions and intensify societal conflict. By tracing the constitution-drafting process in India, Israel and the Irish Free State, the dissertation shows how the use of an incrementalist constitutional approach enables deeply divided societies to either enact a democratic constitution or function with a material one. The incrementalist constitution departs from a "revolutionary" perception of a seminal constitution-making moment and defers controversial choices over the polity's shared norms and values to the realm of ordinary politics. This is achieved through use of a constitutional tool-box including such strategies as ambiguous legal language, ambivalent provisions, or adoption of a set of informal consociational arrangements in lieu of a written constitution. By embracing---rather than ignoring---the competing perspectives of the state, incrementalist constitutions achieve legitimacy and consent by representing the identity of the people as it really is---a deeply divided one. |
