| This dissertation consists of two parts, one experimental and the other philosophical. The fast part of this dissertation is an experimental study of infants' reasoning about the observed actions of others. As opposed to common tendencies to affix infant reasoning processes to universal, absolute principles or cues, the data from these experiments are consistent with a perspective, conceptually articulated and grounded in Part II of the dissertation, on infants as flexibly and actively deciding how properly to attribute aspects of their experiences to real causal configurations---including psychological configurations such as intentions---based on situated and principled judgments. On this interpretation, the basic structure of infants' reasoning processes corresponds to the adult case, but infants' reasoning is performed using knowledge and cognitive structures that from an adult perspective are highly immature. Part II of this dissertation reconciles tensions between scientific and humanistic conceptions of ourselves. In our everyday lives, we experience ourselves and each other as agents who are roughly autonomous and who inhabit the realms of meaning and responsibility. In how we theorize ourselves scientifically, these core aspects of ourselves are hard to situate and can even appear illusory. Part II offers a new grounding of scientific activity and of mental causation that shows how we can improve our capacity to live up to our scientific ideals of objectivity and reliable knowledge consistent with---indeed, through---a more robust and accurate understanding of our capacity for meaningful regulatory agency. |
