| The assignment of cabinet portfolios to parties has a profound effect on the policies adopted by cabinet governments. However, the relationship between portfolio allocation and public policy outcomes has not been adequately addressed in the literature. This dissertation departs from previous work by focusing on the decision-making process inside cabinet governments and its effect on public policy outcomes.;The first chapter examines the relationship between the portfolio allocation of government and welfare state reforms. Using data on social insurance programs from 10 European countries for the time period from 1975 to 1999, I estimate the short- and long-term effects of changes in the partisanship of the social minister. The results in this chapter demonstrate that changes in social policies are highly correlated with ministerial turnover, and less so with the overall ideology of government as previous research suggests.;The second chapter presents a formal model of intra-cabinet decision-making that incorporates the strategic interaction between cabinet members. Policy outcomes in this model are the result of bargaining between a portfolio minister, the prime minister, and the minister of finance. The results of this model suggest that the prime minister may benefit from sharing power with a strong finance minister, as this will constrain ministerial agenda-setting power. The model furthermore specifies the necessary and sufficient conditions under which portfolio ministers can implement their preferred policy choice.;The third chapter tests the empirical validity of the model's main implications. Analyzing the dynamics of social spending in 11 Western European parliamentary systems over a time period of 45 years, I find a strong correlation between the policy position of the party that appoints the social minister and changes in spending. However, and consistent with the theoretical expectations, this correlation is conditional on the allocation of cabinet positions between parties: a party is more successful in changing public policies if it also appoints the finance minister, and less successful if key cabinet positions are in the hands of its coalition partners. |
