Social policy positions in advanced industrial societies: A comparative study of constrained party choices

What determines social policy positions of political parties in advanced industrial democracies? Past research on welfare states has addressed similar questions with regard to social policy output, but has assumed that party positions towards social policies do not change. On the other hand, research on party responsiveness and spatial theories has acknowledged policy position change, but only recognizes changes in public opinion as influencing policy positions. This study argues that the social policy positions of parties vary over time and that these variations are determined by factors more diverse than previously suggested. Party policy positions are determined by changes in voter group demand, as well as economic context. Social policy positions are consequently not simply a product of party strategy, but are best explained by a theory of constrained party choices. Incorporated in this theory is the argument that aggregating voter opinion to the national level, as it is done in most previous studies, is inappropriate. Parties must choose to accommodate the demands of certain voter groups, such as core supporters or uncommitted voters. Disaggregating public opinion in this way more appropriately reveals the nuanced opinion of these groups and enables me to identify when and how preferences of certain voter groups matter to the parties. The dissertation is based on a quantitative investigation of group-, party- and country-level data over time. A large-n study of social policy positions of massed-based parties in ten OECD countries in 1987-2005 serves to test the theory using new data on social policy positions, non-aggregated voter preferences and appropriate contextual measures. I find that major political parties are constrained in their social policy positions by voter group demand and economic context in 1987-2005. However, the mechanisms of both constraints differ by time period. Parties mobilize their core supporters and compensate voters for dire domestic economic conditions with pro-welfare policy positions until 1996. Then voter preferences of unaligned voters become the primary constraint for political parties, combined with the need to compensate voters for the effects of globalization and to reduce the rising costs of benefits for an aging population.