Presidentialism and political instability in Argentina and the United States of America: A comparative study

This is a study of the constitutional/institutional design of the presidential system in Argentina and its possible contribution to the recurrent political instability in Argentina from 1983 until 2003, especially with regard to the interrupted Presidency of Fernando de la Rua. This study claims that the political instability in Argentina, which I represent as a series of interrupted presidencies, is really an outcome of the defective Argentine presidential system itself. Studying the flaws of the Argentine constitutional system offers a better understanding of Argentina's longstanding political instability, examining how the system functioned during the 20-year period of study which witnessed repeated cases of failed presidential terms. In this dissertation, I explore the reasons such presidential breakdowns emerge, calling attention to the defects and weaknesses of Argentina's presidential system, while contrasting it to the American constitutional system's two-plus centuries of survival and success. Beyond emphasizing the argument surrounding the shortcomings of the constitutional/institutional design of the Argentine presidential system itself, this research yields the following main conclusions with regards to the characteristics of this design: first, the Argentine presidential system's constitutional/ institutional design suffers from a number of defects that cause its instability. These defects are: the rigidity of the presidential system; the lack of a system of checks and balances; hyper-Presidentialism; the ambiguity of the system of separation of powers; the absence of an obligation to nominate a vice-president when the post becomes vacant; and the Executive branch's control over the Judicial branch. Second, these defects do not exist in the constitutional design of every presidential system and are notably absent from the American presidential model. Third, the defects of the Constitutional/institutional design of the Argentine presidential system played a crucial role in causing political instability in the country from 1983--2003. This becomes evident when pointing out the effects of these defects and how they impacted the stability of the system itself. Also apparent is how their absence from the American presidential model has led to long-term political stability.