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The politics of institutional design: The choice between presidential and cabinet government in Nationalist China, 1925-193

Posted on:1993-03-25Degree:Ph.DType:Dissertation
University:University of California, San DiegoCandidate:Zhao, SuishengFull Text:PDF
GTID:1476390014496530Subject:Public administration
Abstract/Summary:
A study of seven versions of the Organic Law and several drafts of the constitution indicates that the presidential and cabinet systems existed alternatively during the formative period (1925-1937) of the Chinese Nationalist government. A cabinet system was designed in 1925. A presidential system replaced the cabinet system in 1928. The cabinet system was restored in 1931 and existed until the presidential system was finally installed in 1936.;The alternation of the two systems is explained as an outcome of the power contest among individual political actors. It is found that, in the authoritarian setting of Nationalist China, the presidential system facilitated what Aristotle called "rule by one" whereas the cabinet system accommodated Aristotle's "rule by the few." Chiang Kai-shek, as the single political actor who anticipated becoming dominant in Nationalist China, preferred the presidential system whereas Wang Jingwei, Hu Hanmin, and Sun Ke, each was in a weaker position, sought a share of power by promoting the collective leadership of cabinet system. When a balance of power among the four actors existed in 1925 the cabinet system prevailed. The presidential system was adopted in 1928 when China Kai-shek defeated his rivals. The cabinet system restored in 1931 when a grand anti-Chiang coalition, consisting of Wang, Hu, and Sun, as well as several powerful regional militarists, restored the balance of power. The final establishment of the presidential system in 1936 was an outcome of Chiang's ultimate victory over his rivals.;By exploring the political dynamics of institutional design in Nationalist China, this study argues that institutional design was a choice among competing preferences and an outcome of the struggle for the positions of power from which such a choice could be made. It also offers a theoretical perspective that will enable the Chinese case to be systematically compared with other cases.
Keywords/Search Tags:Presidential, Cabinet, Nationalist china, System, Institutional design, Choice
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