Enduring territorial disputes: Why settlement is not always the best strategy

Most enduring territorial disputes are those over territory with nationalist value (symbolic) and not economic value (resources). This dissertation attempts to answer the question of why it is more difficult to settle disputes over territory with nationalist value compared to territory with economic value. Using both quantitative and qualitative research and a formal model, I demonstrate that when territory has nationalist value, decision makers avoid settlement of the dispute in order to gain domestic and international reputation benefits and to avoid costs that would result from settlement. These benefits are bargaining gains and mobilized domestic support and the costs are damage to a state's bargaining reputation and domestic punishment. Such benefits and costs are typical when states are involved in other territorial disputes or there are other disputed issues between the states, and when decision makers are vulnerable to a domestic populace that has strong nationalist attachment to the disputed territory. When the disputed territory has economic value, decision makers are not as vulnerable due to lack of nationalist attachment to the disputed territory. When states are not involved in other territorial disputes or other disputed issues, gains from avoiding settlement can not be acquired and costs of settlement are lacking, making settlement a better strategy.