| This dissertation consists of two essays on strategic communication and one on bargaining.;The first essay, joint with Attila Ambrus, studies multi-sender cheap talk games. We show that if the state space is large enough, then there exist equilibria arbitrarily close to full revelation of the state that are robust to introducing certain types of imperfections in the senders' observations. The result implies that even when only equilibria robust to noise are considered, if there are multiple experts to consult and the state space is large, there is a communication equilibrium that is strictly better for the principal than delegating the decision right to one of the experts.;The second essay also studies perturbations to the senders' information structure in multi-sender cheap talk games. It shows that equilibria approaching full revelation are ruled out when robustness to a broader class of perturbations---where senders may disagree about the distribution of their signals---is required. The surviving equilibria confer a less dramatic informational advantage to the receiver from consulting multiple senders. They feature an intuitive interval structure, and are coordination-free in the sense that boundaries between intervals reported by different players do not coincide. The coordination-free property implies many similarities between these profiles and one-sender equilibria, and is further justified by appealing to an alternative set of assumptions.;In the third essay, joint with Attila Ambrus, we propose a finite-horizon continuous-time framework for coalitional bargaining that has the following features: (i) expected payoffs in Markov-perfect equilibrium (MPE) are unique, generating sharp predictions and facilitating comparative statics investigations; (ii) MPE are the only subgame-perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) of the model that can be approximated by SPNE of nearby discrete-time bargaining models satisfying a genericness condition, providing justification for focusing on MPE in our model; (iii) the model is relatively tractable analytically. We investigate MPE payoffs as the time horizon goes to infinity. In convex games, we connect these limit payoffs to the core of the characteristic function underlying the bargaining game. |
