| Electricity theft is a relatively unknown crime with high economic costs. In this dissertation, I try to identify the factors that motivate persons to steal electricity. First, I use a panel dataset of 97 countries spanning the five year period 2003–2007 to estimate a model that describes the effect of the unemployment rate, GDP per capita, male population and urbanization on theft, robbery and homicide rates. The results are consistent with previous empirical work on crime and economic opportunity. The second and main contribution of this paper is to estimate the same model using distribution loss as a proxy for electricity theft. The results show that the unemployment rate, a key explanatory economic factor for crime, cannot explain variation in electricity theft, although there is some evidence, albeit weak, supporting correlation in rich countries. Therefore, policies that target the reduction of property crime through a reduction in unemployment will have no effect on electricity theft. The third contribution relates to the role that political institutions play in the incentives to steal electricity. After control for socioeconomic factors, I find that there is no relationship between political governance indicators and electricity theft.;In the second and third chapters, I compare the United States, a high income, low electricity theft country with Jamaica, a middle income, high electricity theft country. The effect of unemployment on electricity theft mirrors the results found in the first chapter. In the United States, electricity theft is affected by changes in economic conditions but in Jamaica, it is not. These results suggest that the state of institutions plays a role in how social norms are determined. Poor countries will be more likely than rich countries to have weak institutions with social norms that encourage electricity theft. |
