Essays on market access through collective action: Analyses of factors affecting the formation, success, and impact of farmer marketing groups in Kenya

Many smallholder farmers in developing countries suffer from poor access to vital financial services, improved inputs, and product markets. Collective action (CA), through the fostering of organizations such as farmer marketing groups, is frequently advocated as a solution to these problems. This study looks at the factors that contribute to the ability of such groups in semi-arid areas of rural Kenya to emerge, survive, and grow; the willingness of farmers to join and patronize them; and the impact of these groups on farmers' incomes and price risk.;This work is based on transaction cost economic theory, which explains why economic agents choose different institutional arrangements ("governance structures") to mediate different types of economic transactions as the structure of transaction costs associated with the exchange vary (Williamson, 1979). We also use the work of Mancur Olson (1965) and Elinor Ostrom on CA to help frame our analysis.;Using household panel and producer-level data collected from Kenya in 2003, 2005, and 2007, the dissertation is organized in five chapters. Chapter 1 reviews briefly the literature on CA and the study area background. Chapter 2 explores in depth the conditions necessary for effective and sustainable producer marketing groups (PMGs) to emerge. The study utilizes both qualitative approaches (case studies) and quantitative approaches (fractional logit and quantile regression) in the analysis. We develop a Group's Success Index and a Group Analysis Framework to identify intervention areas to improve groups' success rates. Chapter 3 explores the correlates of participation in PMGs (whether or not to join the organizations), patronage (the share of sales through the PMG once one has joined) using a Heckman selection model; and the number of CA efforts a farmer joins, estimated using Poisson regression. Chapter 4 examines the impact of PMGs on members' crop incomes and the price risk they face for their crops. We apply a difference in differences (DiD) model for this impact assessment. Chapter 5 discusses important results throughout the study as well as policy implications of the results and limitations in the study.;The results from chapter 2 show that the presence of an altruistic leader or a "core group", good governance structures, diverse activities and regular financial subscription to the group improves success rate. Using a blend of quantitative and qualitative (methods triangulation) analysis, the results provide a broader and a deeper perspective of producer marketing group dynamics and sources of their success. In chapter 3, we find that households that had received assistance from a development agent were more likely to join a group and increase patronage. Access to mobile phones reduced farmer CA participation. Factors such as a democratic group, diverse membership, reciprocity, and risk-mitigating strategies increased CA participation. In chapter 4, the study finds that PMGs do not reduce members' price risk; however, participation did improve crop incomes for PMG members compared to non-members.