| In the first essay, we analyze how the strategic interaction of firms will affect a firm's decision in disclosing verifiable information. In our model, a firm that is privately informed of market demand will compete with an uninformed rival. When it is common knowledge that the firm is informed and the verifiable disclosure requires no cost, there exists an equilibrium in which the informed firm will fully disclose its information. However, when there is uncertainty about whether the informed firm has received the information or not, then the firm's equilibrium ex-post disclosure strategy will depend on the subsequent competition. We consider quantity-competition with three different timings: the informed firm is a Stackleberg leader; the informed firm is a Stackleberg follower; and the two firms choose quantity output simultaneously (Cournot). We show when the informed firm is a leader, the information will be fully revealed for strategic reasons. When the informed firm is a follower or the two firms make quantity decisions simultaneously, in order to maximize its profit, the informed firm will disclose bad news and withhold the good news to make its competitor less aggressive. In the second essay, we analyze the optimal buy-back contracts for a supplier selling to a retailer when demand is uncertain and when the retailer can take a costly hidden action to forecast demand more accurately. The supplier chooses the wholesale and buy back price to maximize his profits given that the retailer's inventory order level and private information acquisition decisions are both chosen to maximize the retailer's profits. In contrast to the standard buy-back contract model in which the first best of the system can always be implemented, our model suggests that the supplier pays not only the cost of acquiring information, but also the information rent to induce the retailer to invest in acquiring information. In this case, the first best of the system cannot be always implemented. Our model can explain the empirical results that the Vendor Managed Inventory systems are prevalent while the retailer is better informed than the supplier, which cannot be well explained by the standard buy-back contract model. |
