Three essays in energy economics

Deregulation in electricity and natural gas market in an attempt to alleviate market power of privately owned utilities is widespread throughout the United States. Beginning with Gollop and Roberts (1979), a number of empirical studies have allowed the data to identify industry competition and marginal cost levels by estimating the firms' first order condition within a conjectural variations framework.; The first chapter of my dissertation uses direct measures of marginal cost for the California electricity market to measure the extent to which estimated mark-ups and marginal costs are biased. My results suggest that the New Empirical Industrial Organization technique poorly estimates the level of mark-ups and the sensitivity of marginal cost to cost shifters.; The second chapter takes advantage of the market structure of electricity and natural gas varies in the United States. The goal of the chapter is to analyze whether combined-billed residential households of electricity and natural gas firms face information costs associated with determining the portion of their monthly energy bill attributed to natural gas consumption and the portion attributed to electricity consumption. However, if households are unable to determine whether an increase in their energy bill is the result of an increase in the price of electricity or an increase in the price of natural gas, they act as if electricity and natural gas were complements. I find that own-price elasticities are smaller in absolute terms in combined-billed markets, while cross-price elasticities are more positive, compared to separate-billed markets; both of these results are consistent with the presence of information costs.; In chapter 3, I provide an empirical evidence of the impact of variations in ownership, regulation and market structure on the electric and natural gas markets in the United States. My results suggest that the private firms in electricity markets are associated with higher prices than public firms. I further find that dual-product firms in the natural gas industry tend to charge less than single product firms. Finally, my results suggest that merger activities in natural gas markets are associated with higher rates after controlling cost and demand.