Political economy of energy taxation in the OECD, 1973--1995 (Norway, United Kingdom)

This research studies political causes and processes determining cross-national differences in manufacturing energy taxation, where energy taxes are assumed effective in inducing more efficient use of energy resources. It is built upon the premise that despite the effects of economic forces, high variance in energy taxation rates reflects differences in state institutional structures and public policy processes. It theorizes that corporatist states have higher environmentally-motivated manufacturing energy taxes, where specific tax rates are determined by the relative bargaining power of energy-intensive producers, the strength of the public opinion pressure and the degree of air pollution (among others). Energy taxation is viewed as a nexus of industrial, environmental and fiscal policies in an attempt to empirically compare their relative weights under the theoretical framework of comparative political economy and institutional analysis.; The dissertation offers a series of statistical tests and two case studies contrasting a corporatist economy against a pluralist one. Due to insufficient data on energy tax rates, the empirical section focuses on manufacturing energy tax revenues for heavy fuel oil, natural gas and electricity taxes.; Factor analyses, panel data tests and two case studies (of Norway and the United Kingdom) did not fully support the institutional proposition. Corporatism does not appear to be associated with higher environmentally-motivated manufacturing energy taxation across all energy types tested.; The politico-economic framework performed better. Although statistical findings call for a cautious interpretation, producer power was found a better predictor of energy taxation policy outcomes and high rates of air pollution were seen to partially induce higher manufacturing energy taxation.; In conclusion, this dissertation revealed that: (1) successful environmental protection in the energy sector is highly contingent upon the national renewable resource endowment. Policy-makers are called to adjust the risk/cost perception of energy asset developers to facilitate the expansion of renewables or/and emissions reduction; (2) Any environmental policy instrument must be considered in conjunction with a full spectrum of risk-spreading policy tools to become acceptable to producer interests; and (3) With the exception of the pluralist agenda-setting stage of policy development, public opinion has a very limited effect on energy/environmental policy process.