HISTORIC BUILT RESOURCES: THEORY AND EXAMPLE OF THE DOUBLE PUBLIC GOOD (CULTURAL ECONOMICS, HISTORIC PRESERVATION, SOCIAL VALUE)

I begin this research by determining that existing theories of externalities and public goods do not adequately address the unique values associated with goods that serve both private and public purposes. The existing literature identifies the nonexcludable, individually-perceived external benefits related to the preservation of historic built resources as nonmarket values (e.g., artistic, bequest, option, and existence). Moreover, extending the theory of aggregate consumption externalities to include the social benefits generated by cultural resource consumption is a relatively straightforward exercise. However, researchers have not previously modeled these externalities as simultaneously occurring external economies. The double public good model captures the continuum of value (from private to social value) by containing simultaneous supply-side and demand-side generated externalities.; This dissertation includes an upfront substantiation of social value, serving to motivate and justify the introduction of the double public good model. I then introduce the base model, solving for the efficiency conditions for: (1) the presentation of historic resources (a stock variable); and (2) the management level (a flow variable including accessibility planning. education, and interpretation). These conditions indicate how social value and preservation externalities affect efficiency conditions. The important contribution is two-fold. First, this model presents rigorously the social values often espoused by the preservation community and clearly indicates how underprovision of social heritage value may result. Second, this work shows how the complementary control variables of historic resource provision and management simultaneously affect the efficiency conditions, illustrating that one optimal level of both historic preservation and of the management of these resources exists.; I extend this model into an intertemporal framework where past and cumulative resource use affect current welfare levels. I follow this by considering second- and third-best constraints on the model. These analyses reveal a generalized method for the provision of historic resources and for management or interpretive programs. Policymakers could implement these basic rules if more research established the qualitative relationships among resource provision, resource management, and resource use.