The face of Atlas: General Bernard Schriever and the development of the Atlas Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, 1953-1960

Beginning in 1953 a small cadre of Air Force missile advocates, aided by allies in the scientific community and in industry, began a coordinated campaign to accelerate the slow pace of the intercontinental ballistic (ICBM) program. They succeeded, and within two years the Atlas ICBM became first the Air Force's, and later the Department of Defense's top development priority. Between 1954 and 1960 the Air Force successfully translated the program's high priority into action; after surmounting significant technical and managerial obstacles, it deployed the first Atlas ICBMs in the fall of 1960.;This technological achievement, often compared in magnitude and significance to the Manhattan Project of World War II, has often been attributed to the leadership of General Bernard Schriever and the management system of "concurrency" that he applied to the missile program. This study challenges that interpretation. By exploring the Atlas program in greater depth than in previous studies, this analysis is able to examine the full range of political, economic, technological, and institutional imperatives that drove missile development.;Research for this project was conducted in three phases. The first was a survey of the relevant secondary literature. The second was an examination of published government documents. The third phase involved reading applicable Air Force records, personal papers, oral histories, and conducting interviews.;The study argues that the rapid development of the Atlas program should not be ascribed solely to the technological or managerial acumen of any one person or group. Instead, the program's success was artributable to a complex web of interlocking factors including the evolution of ballistic missile and thermonuclear weapons technology, a top defense priority, consistent political support, stream-lined management procedures, talented staff, and generous funding. Instead of a seamless management plan, Atlas program management was an ad hoc arrangement, sustained by a set of circumstances that could not be replicated outside of the ICBM program. For that reason, Atlas was not an appropriate model for other large-scale weapons development efforts.