| Why, when, and how do state leaders decide to acquire nuclear weapons? Although the underlying capacities necessary to build nuclear weapons are ubiquitous, fewer than 10 states actually have the bomb. I argue that the decision to go nuclear is a revolutionary decision that requires an extraordinary degree of motivation and certitude. This psychological state can only come about if the individual decisionmaker is seized by an existential fear of an external outgroup and by a staunch ingroup pride. Leaders holding "oppositional nationalist" sentiments have a unique predisposition to experience this explosive psychological cocktail. Oppositional nationalism combines "opposition"---a depiction of the nation as endangered by an Other that is deeply menacing to its core interests and values---with "nationalism"---a depiction of the nation as capable of finding the means and the will that will allow it to face the Other down.; I test my theory against the nuclear histories of four very different countries: Argentina, Australia, France, and India. The first two did not go nuclear, while the second two did. In each case I use rigorous analysis on original data to explain the why, when, and how of their decisions on the bomb, as well as of their decisions on related issues such as whether to build up nuclear technology, to seek nuclear security guarantees, and to sign international nuclear arms control agreements.; The overall approach introduced here has wide potential applicability. The fundamental novelty of this approach is to emphasize the role of emotions as conduits for the expression of deeply held understandings of the nation's purposes and potential in the international arena. It marries a flesh-and blood model of human decisionmaking with a social-scientific approach to issues of measurement and theory-testing. |
