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In the giant's shadow: Harold Wilson and the Vietnam War, 1964--1968 (Lyndon Johnson)

Posted on:2004-09-12Degree:Ph.DType:Dissertation
University:State University of New York at BuffaloCandidate:Barker, Ray ClintonFull Text:PDF
GTID:1465390011973848Subject:History
Abstract/Summary:
Using materials from the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library in Austin, Texas, the Public Record Office in London, memoirs, and secondary sources, this dissertation examines Anglo-American diplomacy during the Vietnam War, 1964–1968. It analyzes the domestic and international dimensions of the Anglo-American “special relationship” between President Lyndon Johnson and Prime Minister Harold Wilson in the crucible of war. It offers the reasons for and limitations of British support for American policy in Vietnam. It details the various attempts initiated through Anglo-American diplomatic channels to reach a negotiated settlement in Vietnam; why those attempts failed; and why, despite those failures, the “special relationship” survived.; The Vietnam War created numerous complications for Anglo-American relations. British support for the American strategy in Vietnam caused controversy within Wilson's government, within his Labour Party, and within his country. While he passionately defended President Johnson over Vietnam for years, there were limits to British support. Wilson would not send British troops into the jungles of Vietnam, and he did not countenance the bombing of targets near Hanoi and Haiphong in 1966 that were too likely to produce civilian casualties and were too close to China. Vietnam is thus understood in the context of British domestic politics, and Wilson's management of Vietnam demonstrates his ability to balance the needs of the Anglo-American alliance and his need to hold together an increasingly uneasy and fractious Labour Party.; Recent historiography on this subject has suggested a simple trade-off between the two men: Johnson offered financial help for Britain's acutely troubled currency in return for support on Vietnam. The evidence cited in this dissertation suggests a more complex reality, where shifting motives on the part of both Wilson and Johnson combined to further the Anglo-American “special relationship” while at the same time their misunderstandings, and even mistrust of one another, resulted in their joint failure to bring about a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam War.
Keywords/Search Tags:Vietnam, Johnson, Lyndon, Wilson
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