Identity theory and the metaphysics of conscious experience

The mind-body problem is, in fact, a cluster of closely related problems. The most vexing problems, it would seem, involve conscious experiences. What is the metaphysical status of qualia, the various "raw feels" of conscious experiences? Can we give an account of the causal efficacy of qualia? Do they take part in the causal goings-on of the physical world? Do they make a difference? And if so, how do we account for this causal potency and relevance? There is, I will argue, a compelling answer to these questions. Qualia are certain neurophysiological properties of the organisms that have them. Both elegant and parsimonious, such an account provides for a straightforward explanation of the causal efficacy of conscious experiences; it provides what I call a tonic for the epiphenomic.;The prima facie case for qualia-body identity involves three components: (1) the argument from ontological simplicity, (2) the argument from qualia efficacy, and (3) the argument from qualia realism. The candidate explanation of qualia-body identity is based on Herbert Feigl's dual-access theory. Dual-access theory is a form of mind-body identity; phenomenal terms refer to the same properties as certain neurophysiological terms. Despite this rejection of ontological dualism, dual-access theory maintains that there is a duality of perspectives such that qualia/brain states can be apprehended from a more or a less direct perspective. One can know about one's own qualia through one's own direct access, or less directly through the study of one's own brain states.;I consider two objections to this view: the objection from the explanatory gap, and the objection from multiple realizability. I argue that dual-access theory meets these objections in a fruitful and perspicuous manner. In sum, dual-access theory offers a compelling account of the relationship between conscious experience and the body, an account which both faithfully preserves the reality and nature of conscious experience and places it firmly within the natural world.