Kant's theory of moral agency

This dissertation is a reconstruction of the theory of agency implicit in Immanuel Kant's practical philosophy, and the relationship between this theory of agency and the grounds of Kant's ethical system. Beginning with an account of the state of both philosophical ethics and agency in pre-Kantian German metaphysics (particularly Christian Wolff and Christian August Crusius), chapter one examines the fundamental concept of the agent adopted by Kant in his critical philosophy. I argue that, although the concept of the agent is similar in both the theoretical and practical works, Kant's system does not allow the use of the cosmological investigation of freedom and agency in the third antinomy of the first Critique to be used in the practical philosophy. Using the works of some contemporary action theorists, I reconstruct Kant's specifically practical concept of the finite rational agent. I then proceed to show how Kant derives both the conditions and structure of his moral psychology and ethical theory from this concept. In light of this concept of the agent, then, chapter three examines Kant's account of practical judgment and the function of maxims. Chapter four examines rational self-obligation by examining Kant's concepts of dependence and necessitation, and moral motivation in the form of respect for the law. In the final chapter, I investigate the scope of the “Kantian” principle “ought implies can”, in light of Kant's concept of virtue in the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft as an infinite striving of the finite rational being toward morality.