| This dissertation is a quantitative analysis of 125 cases of compellent threats 1919--1990. The author explains that the study is intended to test the conventional, realpolitik based explanations for how states targeted by compellent threats respond to the demands made of them. After discussing the inadequacies of previous attempts to understand the nature of threats in international relations, the author outlines the hypotheses being tested.; In the substantive chapter, the author discusses his findings. Realpolitik explanations, largely rooted in rational models of state behaviour, prove to be inadequate in explaining the historical record. Though, as predicted, the powerful initiator states did tend to be more successful in their use of threats, this success did not depend on the weakness of the targeted state. Therefore, the relative power of the states involved had no relationship to the outcome of the encounter. Other hypothesized variables, such as the nature of the demands being made, or the nature of the threats being issued, had no effect on the outcome of the encounters.; The author concludes with a discussion of the implications for these findings and how the presented research can be refined. The author explains how his findings differ from previous findings in this field, and why the choices made in methodology can have serious implications for the validity of the results presented. The author defends his choices, and concludes that though the dissertation is only presented as a first step towards understanding compellence, it offers a fruitful starting point for further research in this area. |
