| The notion of "intuition" is examined in relation to psychology. Although understandings of intuition vary considerably within both psychology and philosophy, important differences are apparent between the primary ways in which it is presented in each field. Specifically, psychological studies frequently portray intuition as a process that may be contrasted with rational and deliberative thinking in two-process models of cognition. It is also characterized as an unconscious mental process, a facet of implicit cognition. In comparison, review of its role within dominant traditions of epistemology reveals intuition to be a foundational component of any form of rational activity, on both preconscious and conscious levels. These differences are analyzed with reference to twentieth century notions analogous to intuition, and their relevance and implications are discussed. Factors contributing to the divergent perspectives on intuition between philosophy and psychology are considered. Finally, an effort is made to identify a philosophically informed role for intuition in the context of current scholarship in psychology. |
