The ambivalent ally: Adenauer, Eisenhower and the dilemmas of the Cold War, 1953-1960

Despite his reputation as a faithful ally and partner of the Eisenhower Administration, German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer made numerous statements as early as 1955 alluding to serious doubts about his American ally. This study of the relationship between Adenauer and the Eisenhower Administration from 1953--1960 asks three questions. First, were the fissures in Adenauer's relationship with Washington---commonly linked with the advent of the Kennedy era---actually present before 1960? If so, how serious were they? Second, did those fissures matter? Did they affect Adenauer's decision-making or outlook in a way that was significant for other events at the time? And finally, how did possible strains in the relationship affect Adenauer's ability to influence Washington?; The analysis finds that Adenauer was both a greater critic of Eisenhower's policies and a more independent thinker on numerous Cold War issues than has previously been suggested. The dissertation concludes that fissures in Adenauer's relationship with America began to appear long before the well-known problems with the Kennedy Administration. It shows that points of contention went beyond the usual areas of focus in the German-American relationship of this era (nuclear and defense issues, Berlin, and German reunification) to include American policy toward the Middle East, Eisenhower's credibility, the American style of negotiating with the Soviets, and the mechanics of verification under arms control agreements, among others. It concludes that these fissures in the relationship were important because they affected Adenauer's perceptions and his decision-making toward both the United States and the larger issues of the Cold War and because they gave a new dimension to Adenauer's policies, from German rearmament to European integration to overtures to the Soviets. Finally, the study analyzes Adenauer's ability to influence Washington and concludes that any single paradigm used to explain a small ally's influence (realism, liberalism, etc.) is unsatisfactory. Adenauer used different tactics at different times, and sometimes several simultaneously, in his attempts to influence American policy. He achieved substantial success, particularly when a high degree of cohesion existed in German and American goals or, in the absence of such cohesion, when the issue at hand dealt directly with Germany.