For profit or power? The strategic purpose of economic exchange in the United States-Japan great power rivalry

The political and economic motivation for and effects of economic exchange among great powers has received considerable attention in recent scholarship. The question of whether states induce or control this exchange for policy purposes has, however, not been examined sufficiently, nor has the importance of any one type of economic exchange been shown to influence state decision makers in accordance with prevailing theoretical perspectives. This dissertation argues that these shortcomings are due to incomplete specification of economic relations among great powers as well as inadequate attention to the relationship among the actors involved in exchange, state decision makers and the policy making process. Too often, the causal relationship between economic interactions and state policy calculation is normatively assumed instead of demonstrated, or is applied only to cases of great power allies or between a great power and a lesser power. Within much of this analysis, defensive or liberal state policy motivation is ascribed, tested for its validity and found to be insufficient in one or more ways. This dissertation remedies this condition by fully examining exchange in a crucial great power rivalry and reintroduces other, offensive, policy motivations and a means of better identifying the qualities of exchange. A more holistic conception of economic exchange is proffered, one that balances qualitative assessment of trade with investment and other financial relationships, in order to better identify overall benefits and vulnerability from exchange relations.; The U.S.-Japan, 1918--1941, case is compared against contending hypotheses from defensive and offensive realism, liberalism and marxism. In beginning the analysis during WWI, evaluation of the theories is more complete and allows for better interpretations of U.S. policy and its effects on Japan's domestic and foreign policies. This interpretation of U.S.-Japan economic and strategic interaction improves upon much of the prevailing political science literature, and adds needed and often overlooked explanations for U.S. economic exchange with Japan. Specifically, this dissertation demonstrates that despite often self-serving corporate maneuverings, the U.S. government used exchange with Japan to fulfill its interwar grand strategy and maximize its relative position going into WWII.