Leaders, legislatures, and international negotiations: A two-level game with different domestic conditions

In this dissertation I present a tractable two-level bargaining game involving three actors: a leader; a domestic actor that is able to constrain the leader; and an unconstrained foreign state. The actors attempt to divide a good or to settle a policy conflict, I study how variables such as the value of the status quo, the potential costs associated with the failure to reach an agreement (such as the possibility of war), the salience of the actors and the order of play affect the bargaining positions of the three actors.; I test my model in two areas, The first set of tests examines the level of concessions that plaintiffs were able to garner in GATT disputes, The second set asks how executive constraints affect the likelihood that a state wins a military interstate dispute. I find that the level of executive constraint is significant and in the direction predicted in all of the models tested. The more constrained the executive, the better the outcome it achieves.; I present two additional models, each with a different focus, First, while negotiations over the original issue continue on the international arena, a domestic issue (pertinent only to the actors in the democracy) is introduced. The game shows that constrained leaders benefit from domestic linkages, The second extension adds an election stage. There are interactions between the preferences of the legislature and the likely voting behavior of the electorate. For example, a legislature may carry out the government's "dirty work" by voting down an international agreement that it would otherwise accept in order to protect the leader from electoral wrath.; I examine two cases in depth. I compare the negotiations that led to the 1979 Camp David agreement between Israel and Egypt to episodes of unsuccessful negotiations between Israel and Syria over the Golan Heights. I also look at how the prospects for a cooperative agreement between Israel and Syria have changed over time under different governments and changing electoral systems.