| This research explores the following puzzles: Do small state decisions arise from outside pressure or are the made unilaterally? How can variation in participation between small states be explained? Did post Cold War defense reforms by NATO derive from domestic decisions, the organization, or international structures and pressure?; To answer these questions, this research examines micro-level decisions concerning defense reductions and conscription with different impacts on the militaries in two small NATO member states, the Netherlands and Belgium. In Belgium, withdrawal from Germany was massive and conscription ended suddenly. In the Netherlands, troop withdrawal from Germany was minor and conscription eliminated with an implementation period. Variation between the two countries is explained by the military bureaucracy's ability to oversee policy. The military bureaucracy must chose a policy position within the Defense Minister's preference area. If the bureaucracy fails to choose such a point, it loses control of the agenda to the Defense Minister. Divided government in a coalition parliamentary government may obscure the preferences of the actors and hinder the bureaucracy's proposed policy choice. The Dutch outcome is explained by the military bureaucracy's successful retention of the agenda while the Belgian military lost control over the agenda to the Defense Minister.; Exploring domestic decisions is crucial because despite the common perception that small states have little leeway for making their own policy, both countries acted unilaterally on these issues. These small state decisions actually had a consequent influence on NATO strategy and force requirement reforms. |
