The treatment of marriage under the United States Federal Income Tax, 1913 to 2000

This dissertation provides a history of the treatment of marriage under the U.S. federal income tax from 1913 to 2000. It examines political, expert, and public debates over tax equity---defined as how society distributes the tax burden---to explain how the federal government taxed married versus single persons, and single-earner versus dual-earner families. These debates offer insights into the American economy, political landscape, and culture. They present a particularly clear window on American social norms, especially the conceptualization of gender roles and family forms.; Although competing notions of tax equity were central to changes in the income tax treatment of marriage, they represent just one factor in the history of taxing marriage in the United States. The "democratic institutionalist" model accounts for additional factors. The "democratic" part of this interpretative approach emphasizes forces of democracy outside the federal government, such as social and political movements, public interest and lobbying groups, evolving social and economic demographics, and social norms. The force of ideas---competing notions of tax equity, for instance---also plays a prominent role in the "democratic" element of democratic institutionalism. Ideas animate political, expert, and public debates over taxation. Moreover, they facilitate discussion among members of the "institutionalist" component of democratic institutionalism. The president, members of Congress, party ideology, constitutional arrangements, and professional experts inform the tax policymaking process. These institutional actors use ideas to communicate with each other and, in turn, with the democratic forces outside of government.; The democratic institutionalist model recognizes influences beyond the control of policymakers, experts, and citizens such as war, depression, and other national emergencies. These historical contingencies provide new constraints and opportunities for tax policymakers and officials through, for instance, new economic structures and administrative organization. They produce, moreover, new tax regimes that change the economic, political, and intellectual environment of tax policymaking.