A two-level approach to domestic politics and international cooperation

A two-level model of international policy coordination was developed consisting of an international negotiations game and a domestic lobbying game. The model implies that a nation's net benefit to cooperation depends not only on international factors, but also on the degree of relative domestic support for cooperation from its domestic constituents. The degree of relative domestic support is determined by political pressure applied by opposing domestic interest groups who seek support in international negotiations. Thus, a policymaker attempts to maximize his political support by negotiating an international agreement that will be acceptable to his domestic constituents. The results propose that when domestic pressure exists in international negotiations, a policymaker will adjust his bargaining position at the international level to reflect the interests of the group that applies greater pressure. Consequently, the distribution of the gains from cooperation may be altered causing the two-level outcome to be different from the one-level outcome. The two-level model was applied to the case of military alliances. An initial investigation of the two-level effects of international trade was also conducted.