| Although an understanding of deterrence is an important part of comprehending the outbreak of international conflict, this knowledge has been hampered by a variety of factors, particularly the divide between formal theories and quantitative analysis of deterrence. In this dissertation, I attempt to bridge this gap between formal theories of deterrence and empirical research through several important steps. First, I develop the concept of a politically active dyad in order to select cases of general deterrence. An empirical test demonstrates that this concept captures opportunity as a necessary condition for international conflict.; I then evaluate both equilibrium predictions and relationship predictions of perfect deterrence theory. To test whether the equilibrium predictions of perfect deterrence theory are supported by the historical record, I use binary and multinomial logit methods to examine the prediction of militarized interstate disputes and of particular game outcomes. The results indicate that the predictions of perfect deterrence theory are generally supported by the empirical record. I then apply perfect deterrence theory to examine the impact that varied dispute resolution arrangements have on future discord, and the resultant expectations are strongly supported.; I also develop an extension of deterrence theory by introducing a formal model considering direct and extended deterrence situations simultaneously. I develop the Three-party Extended Deterrence Game and analyze it in conditions of both complete and incomplete information. These analyses allow conclusions to be drawn not only regarding extended deterrence, but also regarding the related areas of alliance reliability and war expansion. I conclude by laying out a variety of implications this dissertation has for future research and foreign policy. |
