Deterrence, compellence, and rational decision making

Coercion is the use of threats or force to affect an adversary's choice. Theories of coercion, especially those of deterrence and compellence, are frequently characterized as applications of rational decision theory. Yet their development, theoretical structure, and the models operationalized to test them suggest otherwise. The vast majority misrepresent the adversary's choice situation, omit essential components of its decision calculus, and relate causal factors to one another and outcomes according to alternative principles. Most therefore represent rivals to a rational theory of coercion. Their acceptance as 'rational choice' models has caused many problems, including biased estimates of the strength, magnitude, and direction of causal effects; an inclination for forecasting over explanation; a preference for simplistic rival theories over more comprehensive ones; and confusion regarding theories of rational decision making. I apply rational decision theory to model the choice situation of an adversary under threat, systematically integrate apparently disparate causal influences, and compare the requirements of deterrence and compellence implied by distinct variants of rational decision theory---expected utility theory and prospect theory.