Well-tempered discontent: Nationalism, ethnic group politics, electoral institutions and parliamentary behavior in the Western half of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, 1867--1914

This dissertation tests competing theories of political behavior in ethnically divided societies by examining the Parliament and parliamentary elections in the Western half of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy ("Austria") between 1867 and 1914. Exceptionalist theories of ethnic group conflict view ethnic loyalties as uniquely strong and disruptive. Non-exceptionalist theories, such as those found in the literature on comparative democratic institutions, view ethnic divisions as simply yet another potential source of political cleavage. These theories thereby produce diverging recommendations for democratic institutional design in ethnically divided societies, specifically with regards to consociationalism. Since Austria gradually implemented universal manhood suffrage in the decades before World War I, and was characterized by extreme ethno-national heterogeneity, it provides an excellent opportunity to examine the effects of ethnic divisions on political behavior in a variety of institutional and demographic contexts.; Careful examination of the interaction between political institutions and ethnic divisions in Austria affirms the non-exceptionalist position. District-level votes were no more likely to reflect ethnic than other societal cleavages, and the resulting party system was no more divided along ethnic lines than it was along urban-rural, regional, religious-secular, socio-economic and ideological ones. Furthermore, the Austrian Parliament proved itself more capable of multi-ethnic legislative compromise than often is acknowledged.; Several specific findings force us to reconsider a case that is central to current understandings of nations and nationalism in general and East Central European political development in particular. District-level data suggest that the Austrian electorate voted across ethnic lines far more frequently than has previously been recognized. Moreover, the common perception that Austrian voters were becoming more nationalistic over time does not withstand close scrutiny. Finally, such problems as the hyper-fractionalization of the Austrian party system and the frequent use of parliamentary obstruction can be attributed to institutional design, particularly executive non-accountability, rather than ethnic division as such. More generally, by affirming non-exceptionalist views, this study supports more optimistic appraisals of democratic possibilities in ethnically divided societies.